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North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces are currently deployed in 
three Balkan states:  Bosnia-Herzegovina; Yugoslavia, in the province of Kosovo; and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  These three deployments 
represent NATO’s attempts to date to conduct crisis management operations, a mission 
the Alliance adopted in the early 1990s and now a fundamental security task alongside 
collective defense.  In view of the increasing importance of crisis management in NATO 
activities, this thesis analyzes the Balkan operations to identify lessons that can be 
applied to future doctrines.  NATO’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts are reviewed to 
illustrate the development of NATO’s crisis management doctrine.  Each Balkan 
intervention is examined to clarify NATO’s crisis management failures and successes, 
and to assess apparent lessons.  The thesis compares the lessons learned with the crisis 
management doctrine contained in the 2001 NATO Handbook, and offers 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 
1949, the first use of deadly force by the Alliance did not occur until 28 February 1994, 
when NATO aircraft patrolling the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-imposed 
no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina shot down two Bosnian Serb aircraft.  Since 1992, 
when NATO first undertook no-fly zone and embargo enforcement missions, NATO 
operations have been almost entirely focused on crisis management—so-called “non-
Article 5 missions”—and conducted in the Balkans.  At present, NATO troops—joined 
by some non-NATO forces—are conducting such missions in three non-NATO nations:  
the Stabilization Force (SFOR) is in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 
the Kosovo province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and the troops in 
OPERATION AMBER FOX in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).  
The forces in FYROM represent NATO’s third attempt at crisis management in the 
Balkans.  In the cases of SFOR and KFOR—and increasingly AMBER FOX—none of 
the missions appears likely to conclude in the foreseeable future. 
An indicator of the importance attached to crisis management may be found in a 
review of the 2001 NATO Handbook.  A word search finds that the phrase “crisis 
management” is used 121 times, while the phrase “collective defence” appears only 32 
times.  While the latter was still presented as a key element of NATO’s existence, it was 
the former which took much of the focus. 
When NATO invoked Article 5 after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on 
the United States, it appeared possible that the Alliance would shift its focus back to 
collective defense.  However, the operations in Afghanistan to date—with non-native 
military operations almost entirely conducted by U.S. forces, while NATO member states 
have provided mostly political and intelligence support1—and the continuing NATO 
                                                 
1 The main exception to this has been the United Kingdom, which has provided troops on the ground, such as the 
Marine detachment at Bagram airbase and special forces, and strike support with cruise missile launches, surveillance, 
and refueling.  See CNN.com, “UK Troops Set to Be Stood Down,” 26 November 2001, 
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/11/26/gen.britain.troops1000/index.html> and CNN.com, “British 
Ground Troops on Standby,” 26 October 2001, 
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/25/ret.british.troops/index.html>. 
2 
commitment in the Balkans indicate that crisis management in southeastern Europe will 
remain a major mission for the Alliance for some time to come.  NATO’s Secretary 
General, Lord George Robertson, acknowledged this in February 2002 when he said that 
NATO “has a vital role - in my view the vital role - to play in multinational crisis 
prevention and crisis management.”2  In fact, a major point of the Secretary General’s 
speech was that better crisis prevention and crisis management could preclude the 
emergence of collective defense challenges such as terrorism, as demonstrated in 
practical terms by the destruction of Al-Qaida cells in the Balkans.3 
This thesis analyzes NATO’s operations in the Balkans and their respective 
outcomes in light of the following question:  What lessons can be learned from NATO’s 
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and what implications do they have for NATO’s future  
crisis management doctrine? 
This thesis identifies the lessons that can be drawn from the outcomes of the 
various NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FRY, and FYROM.  Each 
intervention was conducted for the purpose of crisis management, yet each operation was 
different, with divergent outcomes.  The changes from one operation to the next, most 
notably the differences in OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL HARVEST and AMBER FOX in 
FYROM as compared to the earlier interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY, 
suggests that a learning process within NATO has already taken place.  This thesis 
examines NATO’s principal Balkan operations to cull possible lessons from them and 
thereby, it is hoped, contribute to the development of NATO’s crisis management 
doctrine. 
The second chapter provides an overview of NATO’s crisis management 
doctrines during the operations in the Balkans.  The Alliance’s 1991 Strategic Concept, 
written to address the changing security environment in Europe following the dissolution 
of the Warsaw Pact, indicated the original shift in focus from traditional Communist 
bloc-oriented collective defense to risks that were “multi- faceted in nature and multi-
                                                 
2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  NATO’s Future:  Speech by NATO’s Secretary General, Lord 
Robertson.  4 February 2002.  6 February 2002. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020203a.htm>. 
3 Ibid. 
3 
directional.”  These risks were more likely to come from the “adverse consequences of 
instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, 
including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes,” that many countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe were facing. 4  The 1999 Strategic Concept elevated the relative 
importance of the crisis management mission, listing it as a “fundamental task” to 
achieve the “essential purpose” of the Alliance.5   
The following three chapters consist of case studies of the NATO operations in 
the Balkans:  Bosnia-Herzegovina in chapter III; the FRY in chapter IV; and FYROM in 
chapter V.  The NATO operations in each country are outlined and analyzed.  The 
conduct of operations is compared to the doctrine of crisis management prevailing at the 
time of the intervention, and the outcomes are compared to the stated objectives to 
determine how well the latter were met.  From this analysis, lessons are drawn as to the 
effectiveness of specific approaches to crisis management. 
The sixth chapter assesses the future of crisis management in NATO in light of 
the lessons from the Balkan operations.  NATO’s view of crisis management, most 
recently delineated in the 2001 NATO Handbook, is reviewed and compared to the 
lessons learned from Bosnia-Herzegovina, FRY, and FYROM.  Where there are 








                                                 
4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State 
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council.  10 July 2000.  4 February 
2002.  <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm>, paragraph 8, 9. 
5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of 
State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Washington, D.C., 23-24 



































II. NATO’S CRISIS MANAGEMENT DOCTRINES 
When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, some analysts began to question the 
viability of NATO.  With no obvious enemy to defend against, what need was there for a 
collective defense organization of this magnitude?  The member states of NATO were 
also looking for the answer to that question, for a reason to support the continuing 
necessity of the Alliance.   
A. 1991 STRATEGIC CONCEPT 
Their initial answer was NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept, which opened with the 
recognition by all member heads of state and government that the Alliance needed to be 
transformed “to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe.”6    However, while the 
end of the “political division of Europe” removed the largest threat to NATO member 
states, it also left the Alliance in a security environment that was much less predictable 
and potentially more dangerous.7  Potential risks to the member states were difficult to 
predict and assess, and less likely to come from calculated aggression than from 
instability—due to “the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including 
ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes”—in Central and Eastern Europe.8   
The collective defense mission remained paramount, the only objective listed as 
the purpose of the Alliance in the 1991 Strategic Concept.9  The concern of NATO was 
the possibility of crises involving outside powers in Europe endangering the security of 
the entire continent or spilling over into member states.10  As a result, one of the 
fundamental tasks of the Alliance was “to provide…a stable security environment in 
Europe…in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European 
nation.”11 It was for these specific situations—where the security of the Alliance was 
                                                 
6 North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of  State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Rome, 7-8 November 1991).  10 July 2000.  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm>, intro., paragraph 1. 
7 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 1. 
8 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 8, 9. 
9 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 15. 
10 7-8 November, 1991, paragraph 9. 
11 7-8 Novemb er, 1991, paragraph 20i. 
6 
threatened either directly or through a threat to all of Europe—that NATO introduced the 
mission of crisis management.12 
Crisis management in the 1991 Strategic Concept included preventive diplomacy 
and “appropriate...measures as required from a range of political and other measures, 
including those in the military field,” to resolve crises at the earliest possible stage.13  The 
focus was largely on dialogue and cooperation, to reduce the possibility of 
misunderstandings growing into conflicts, and on working within the framework of other 
international organizations, including the CSCE, the European Community, the Western 
European Union, and the UN.14  Exactly what those appropriate measures could or 
should be was not definitively stated, nor were specific force requirements given. 15  The 
emphasis for force structure remained on the ability to deter or repulse an attack on a 
NATO member, but the role of the military was expanded to include contributing to the 
stability of Europe and ensuring that peace was preserved.  Again, this largely meant 
dialogue with the militaries of other states and cooperation in joint exercises, but it also 
included the possibility of taking part in UN missions.16  Other than specifying the 
mobility and flexibility to react and deploy in a timely manner to respond to crises, the 
majority of the directives given regarding force structure focused on the primary mission 
of the Alliance rather than crisis management.17 
Less than a year after the 1991 Strategic Concept was released, NATO was 
operating in the former Yugoslavia in support of economic sanctions and the arms 
embargo.  The much-touted shift in focus was not matched by a shift in capabilities and 
                                                 
12 The phrase “crisis management” was used by NATO during the Cold War, but was applied above 
all to Article 5 missions of collective defense.  “It signified NATO’s intention to bring any eventual violent 
confrontation with the Warsaw Pact to a conclusion as rapidly as possible, with a minimum of armed 
combat and destructive use of force.”  See David Yost, NATO Transformed:  The Alliance’s New Roles in 
International Security (Washington, D.C.:  United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000) 189. 
13 7-8 November, 1991, paragraph 32-33. 
14 7-8 November, 1991, paragraph, 25, 33.  In November 1993, with the entry into force of that 
Maastricht Treaty, the European Community became the European Union (EU).  In December 1994, the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe became the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE). 
15 7-8 November, 1991, paragraph 40. 
16 7-8 November, 1991, paragraph 41.  It should be noted that this paragraph is numbered 42 in some 
published versions of the 1991 Strategic Concept. 
17 7-8 November, 1991, paragraph 44-53. 
7 
framework to meet these new obligations, and the Allies disagreed about whether the 
crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be categorized as a threat to greater European security 
or a specific NATO member state.  As a result, there was no consensus on when or how 
to act, and from 1991 through 1995, arguments over Bosnia-Herzegovina added to the 
strain across the Atlantic within the Alliance.  The Alliance nonetheless became more 
involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on February 28, 1994, NATO used deadly force for 
the first time, shooting down two Bosnian Serb aircraft violating the United Nations (UN) 
no-fly zone.18  In August 1995, Operation Deliberate Force was launched in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, leading to the Dayton Peace Accords.  The NATO-led Implementation 
Force (IFOR) conducted its mission for the prescribed year, followed by the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR). 
B. 1999 STRATEGIC CONCEPT 
Less than four years after the conclusion of the Dayton agreement in November 
1995, NATO aircraft were again in the skies of the former Yugoslavia.  The Rambouillet 
peace negotiations had failed, and this time the Alliance was hitting targets in the FRY, 
including Kosovo, as part of Operation Allied Force.  During the seventy-eight day 
bombing campaign in March – June 1999, NATO issued its 1999 Strategic Concept.  The 
shift in focus from collective defense to crisis management missions was more 
pronounced, and the Balkans were specifically mentioned as an example of the type of 
crisis the Alliance could expect to face and needed to be able to deal with. 19  
 In the 1991 Strategic Concept references to crisis management were 
sparse.  The phrase occurred only four times in the document, and “Management of Crisis 
and Conflict Prevention” was the last of five topics listed under “A Broad Approach to 
Security.”20  In contrast, crisis management was explicitly listed in the 1999 version as a 
fundamental task for enhancing “the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.”21  
                                                 
18 Yost, 193, 195. 
19 North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  The Alliance's Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of 
State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Washington, D.C., 23-24 
April 1999).  24 April 1999.  <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. 
20 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Rome, 7-8 November 1991), paragraph 31-33. 
21 7-8 November 1991, paragraph 10. 
8 
In April 1999 NATO made clear why it considered intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo to 
be both necessary and in the Alliance’s interests: 
Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed 
efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states 
can lead to local and even regional instability. The resulting tensions could 
lead to crises affecting Euro-Atlantic stability, to human suffering, and to 
armed conflicts. Such conflicts could affect the security of the Alliance by 
spilling over into neighbouring countries, including NATO countries, or in 
other ways, and could also affect the security of other states.22  
In the 1991 Strategic Concept crisis management was addressed mostly in 
reference to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, regarding consultation between the 
member states when their security was threatened.  The 1999 Strategic Concept 
introduced for the first time the idea of crisis management in accordance with Article 7, 
which recognized the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 23  The importance of other European 
security institutions and the UN was reiterated.24 
The key difference between the Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 was that in 
the latter military intervention played a greater role alongside the concepts of dialogue 
and cooperation for the prevention and management of crises.  Immediately after the 
necessity for capabilities to conduct collective defense, the need for forces capable of 
conducting conflict prevention and crisis management operations “under the full range of 
foreseeable circumstances” was asserted.25  These military operations were envisioned in 
accordance with the offer made by NATO in 1994 to support UN Security Council or 
OSCE operations on a case-by-case basis.26  Early intervention was also emphasized, in 
order to keep crises from developing into conflicts or, if that was not possible, to at least 
keep the conflicts at a distance from NATO member states.  For such intervention and for 
peacekeeping or humanitarian emergency missions, the need for diverse military 
                                                 
22 24 April 1999, paragraph 20. 
23 24 April 1999, paragraph 10.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  The North Atlantic Treaty 
(Washington D.C, 4 April 1949).  03 May 2002.  < http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>. 
24 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (Washington D.C., 23-24 April 1999), paragraph 14. 
25 24 April 1999, paragraph 29. 
26 24 April 1999, paragraph 31. 
9 
capabilities at various levels of readiness was emphasized.27  Cooperation and 
partnership still played an important role in NATO’s Strategic Concept, but the emphasis 
had shifted from dialogue to avoid misunderstandings to joint military operations with 
Partnership for Peace countries.28  Crisis management beyond the immediate borders of 
NATO territory, early intervention, and the option of military intervention if dialogue 























                                                 
27 24 April 1999, paragraph 48-9. 




























III. NATO IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
On April 6, 1992, the European Community recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
an independent state.  Officially, the war in Bosnia dates from the day of recognition, but 
fighting had been going on for more than a week.29  Bosnian Serb forces, supplemented 
with remnants of the Yugoslav army and supported by the  government in Belgrade, 
began working to control as much of Bosnia as they could in the hopes of “ethnically 
cleansing” the territory of Bosnian Muslims and Croats.  Various Bosnian Croat factions, 
seeing the writing on the wall, moved to seize as much territory as they could with the 
overt approval of the government of Croatia.  In between were the outmatched and under-
armed Bosniaks.30 
Without a patron and deprived of military equipment by the UN arms embargo, 
the Bosniaks had no chance to correct their military deficiencies.  One of the reasons for 
the reluctance of the major European powers to allow more arms into the area was a 
complete misjudgment of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Western politicians 
referred to the conflict as a “civil war,” and implied that all parties were equally at 
fault.31  The European Community had monitors in the country, but the UN refused to 
dispatch peacekeepers when Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic requested them.32  In 
mid-April 1991, Izetbegovic requested NATO air strikes against the Serbian aggressors; 
it was not until the next year that NATO became involved, and then it was to assist in 
enforcing the arms embargo.33  
                                                 
29 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia:  A Short History (New York:  New York UP, 1996) 234-5. 
30 “Bosniak” is sometimes used to describe the nationality of the non-Serb and non-Croat citizens in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, both to avoid the religious connotations the label “Muslim” gives to Western readers 
(and which is not characteristic of the population) and to avoid the inconsistency caused by not also 
referring to Croats as “Catholics” and Serbs as “Orthodox.”  See Yost, 376, n. 15. 
31 Ibid, 238-9, 242-3. 
32 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe:  Yugoslavia and its Destroyers  (New York:  Times 
Books, 1999) 172.  UN negotiator Cyrus Vance, focused on the need for a peacekeeping force in Croatia in 
mid-1991, explained to Zimmermann that “peacekeepers are used after a conflict, not before.” 
33 Ibid, 197. 
12 
By the end of 1992, NATO was enforcing the economic sanctions against Serbia 
and Montenegro, patrolling and enforcing the no-fly zone, delivering humanitarian 
supplies, supporting the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia as a whole, 
providing close air support for UNPROFOR, and conducting limited air strikes; these 
were NATO’s principal actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina until August 1995.34   In the 
meantime, the UN Security Council had responded in June 1992 to Izetbegovic’s request 
for peacekeepers by authorizing the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).35   These troops 
were assigned to assist in the delivery of aid, but beyond that, their mission was 
unclear.36  Although UNPROFOR’s actions helped to avert an even greater humanitarian 
disaster in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the troops proved to be more liability than asset when 
hundreds were taken hostage by Bosnian Serb forces.37  The UN’s establishment of the 
so-called “safe areas” was another failure, as was shown most brutally at Srebrenica, 
where thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were slaughtered by Bosnian Serb forces. 
The main diplomatic effort before NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was the Vance-Owen plan developed by negotiators from the EC and the UN.  The plan 
called for several cantons based on ethnic populations.  While it stipulated that refugees 
be allowed to return and organized the Serbian territory in such a way that it could not be 
joined in a Serb republic, it managed to alienate all parties by seeming to reward ethnic 
cleansing (the Muslim and Croat view), but not enough (the Serb view).38  With such 
strong and universal rejection, no military mission to enforce it was feasible.39 
B. NATO’S INTERVENTION 
As early as 1992, Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
was pushing hard for NATO air strikes.  He was a proponent of limited strikes focusing 
on the elimination of Serbian military installations, equipment, and supply routes.  The 
                                                 
34 Yost, 193-4. 
35 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-1996 (London:  Oxford 
UP, 1995) 303. 
36 Malcolm, 247. 
37 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton (Washington, D.C.:  Brookings Institution Press, 2000) 41. 
38 Malcolm, 247-8. 




goal was to make credible the threat of force and provide an incentive to the Serbs to 
come to the negotiating table.40  Other analysts were arguing that only NATO had the 
credibility to guarantee the borders of Central and Eastern European countries—thereby 
reducing the incentive for Serbian and Croatian advances in Bosnia-Herzegovina—and 
that the Alliance should be deployed with a strong mandate to fight if necessary. 41  
It was not until August 1993 that all the allies agreed on the necessity of 
threatening and, if necessary, conducting NATO air strikes.  However, reaching that 
agreement required sharing the decision on conducting strikes with the UN, the “dual 
key” arrangement.42  It was nearly six months and an artillery shell in a Sarajevo 
marketplace later before strikes were even threatened.  The threat worked--Serb forces 
ended the siege of Sarajevo.43  At the end of 1994, unfortunately, the results were not as 
good.  Air strikes on Serbian assets involved in the assault of Bihac, another “safe area,” 
and threats of more to come not only did not deter the Serbs; they led to the first 
detention of UN peacekeepers and observers.  Allies with vulnerable UNPROFOR troops 
rejected further strikes to answer the Serb action. 44  The next round of hostage taking by 
the Serb forces in May 1995 led the UN to refuse to conduct any more strikes.  The 
longer NATO failed to take decisive action, the louder questions on NATO’s credibility 
became—even from members.  William Perry, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, assessed 
NATO thus in 1995:  “Paralyzed into inaction, NATO seemed to be irrelevant in dealing 
with the Bosnian crisis...It appeared to me that NATO was in the process of 
unraveling.”45 
It took a strong push from the United States to finally break the UN/NATO 
impasse in July 1995.  Serb forces had taken many of the eastern “safe areas” and had 
announced that they would finish the war by autumn. 46  Agreement was reached in July 
                                                 
40 Zimmermann, 214-5. 
41 Pfaff, 97. 
42 Daalder, 21-2. 
43 Ibid, 25-6. 
44 Ibid, 32-3. 
45 Perry quoted in Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (New York:  Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998) 80. 
46 Ibid, 67-8. 
14 
between the allies and the UN that an attack, or preparation for an attack, on the “safe 
area” of Gorazde would result in massive air strikes not only in the vicinity but against 
Serb forces throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.  More importantly, the responsibility for 
approving air strikes in defense of forces on the ground would rest with the ground 
commander, not the UN Secretary General or his representative.  Potential targets were 
identified and prioritized:  Option 1 targets were air defense systems and Bosnian Serb 
forces in the field; Option 2 targets were command-and-control facilities, supply and 
munitions sites, radars and missile sites, and force concentrations; and Option 3 targets 
were dual-use infrastructures.  Lastly, the taking of UN hostages would not result in a 
cease-fire.47  
On 28 August 1995, Serb forces shelled Sarajevo once again.  Two days later, 
NATO responded with Operation Deliberate Force.  Over 3,000 sorties were flown by the 
end of the operation on 14 September 1995.  At the same time, the Muslim and Croatian 
forces were able to take advantage of the disarray of the Serbian forces and conducted 
offensives for their biggest gains of the war.  The ratio of territory controlled by the Serbs 
and the Muslims/Croats respectively shifted from 70/30 to almost 50/50.48  These 
operations brought Belgrade to the negotiating table as the representative of the Bosnian 
Serbs. 
The result of these negotiations was the Dayton Peace Accords, which gave fifty-
one percent of the country to the Muslim-Croat Federation and forty-nine percent to the  
Republika Sprska.  Neither side was pleased with the outcome—one Bosnian Serb 
representative reportedly fainted at the sight of the final map—but neither side had a 
choice.49   Milosevic represented the Bosnian Serbs, since the negotiators refused to deal 
with their leaders directly, and Milosevic was willing to sign away quite a bit to get the 
sanctions on the FRY lifted.  The Muslims, on the other hand, were told that they could 
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take it or leave it, and since leaving it meant losing their benefactor—NATO—they 
signed.50  
C. THE END STATE 
IFOR officially took authority from UNPROFOR on 20 December 1995, bringing 
in 60,000 troops for one year to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace 
Accords.  Its mission was to end hostilities, separate the armed forces, reshape internal 
boundaries, and move forces and heavy equipment to designated storage sites.  IFOR was 
declared a success only six months in to the mission.  Yet, one year after IFOR arrived, it 
was replaced by SFOR; why, if IFOR’s mission was complete?51  
SFOR, with 19,000 troops as of May 2002, has a different mission:  providing 
increased levels of support to civilian organizations operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina by 
giving them a safe and secure environment in which to work.52  Perhaps the key 
difference between the two forces is that IFOR’s mission was to implement the Dayton 
peace agreement, while SFOR’s mission includes not only preventing a resumption of 
hostilities and promoting a peaceful climate, but also providing an increasing level of 
support to civilian organizations.53  SFOR was meant to operate until June 1998, but well 
before that time it was recognized that a longer stay would be necessary to build a lasting 
peace; the mandate has been extended indefinitely.54   
While IFOR did handle the military aspects of the Dayton agreement as assigned, 
those formed only the beginning of a lasting peace plan.  It is the non-military aspects--
civil, economic, and political--that are needed to build a strong state, and these are the 
ones not being implemented for the most part.55  Perhaps the most glaring deficiency is 
the poor record on arrests of indicted war criminals.  Concern over the detrimental effect 
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of SFOR casualties has allowed the worst inciters of violence—Radovan Karadzic, the 
former Bosnian Serb political leader, and Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb military 
commander, are two of the most commonly mentioned—to walk free and continue to 
block necessary reforms and healing.56  Until these aspects are dealt with, an atmosphere 
of distrust, fear, and hatred will prevail, and NATO troops will continue to be needed in 
SFOR. 
D. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
The first of the lessons that can be drawn from the NATO experience in Bosnia is 
the simple fact that U.S. leadership in NATO is essential.  When U.S. Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher traveled to Europe to present the lift-and-strike plan while in a 
“‘listening mode,’” the allies were appalled at the apparent unwillingness of the United 
States to take the lead.57  For a time, the United States operated under the belief that it 
had to choose between NATO and Bosnia, and the Alliance was more important; to save 
NATO, it was argued, America had to stop pushing to use it.  In contrast, when the 
United States took the initiative in August 1995, it got the agreement it wanted that 
eventually led to Operation Deliberate Force, and the Europeans were relieved even if 
they did not like all aspects of the plan. 58 
This lack of direction led to the second lesson from Bosnia-Herzegovina—the 
importance of NATO intervening on its own terms.  In the case of Bosnia, the United 
States was pushed by the realization that UNPROFOR was close to being declared a 
failure, resulting in a withdrawal covered in part by U.S. troops.  There was disagreement 
among U.S. officials as to how automatic the U.S. military participation was in NATO 
OPLAN 40104, the operation to cover UNPROFOR’s retreat, and who did or did not 
know about it in detail.  However, the fact remained that the time was rapidly 
approaching when the United States was going to run the risk of leaving its allies 
uncovered—likely a disastrous blow for the alliance.59  NATO had to act or be forced 
into a worse position. 
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A third lesson can be drawn from the interactions among the various international 
organizations.  From 1991 to 1995, a concerted effort was launched to “interlock” various 
international institutions to provide collective security in Europe.  However, despite the 
considerable activity that took place, the UN, the EU, the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE, subsequently the OSCE), and NATO proved unable to 
prevent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.60  In June 1992, NATO foreign ministers announced 
their readiness to participate in peacekeeping missions with the CSCE on a case-by-case 
basis; in December of that year that pledge was extended to UN-sponsored peacekeeping 
missions.61  Despite this, the “interlocking” institutions proved at best excuses for 
inaction and at worst obstacles to dealing with the situation in Bosnia.62  UN-NATO 
relations especially appeared to have taken on the appearance of “interblocking 
institutions.”63  The “dual key” arrangement, requiring approval through two separate 
organizational structures, was widely regarded as a complete failure.  It was intended to 
enhance the legitimacy of any use of force by NATO, but functioned to block 
constructive action by the Alliance. 
There were two lessons to be drawn from the negotiations.  First, if the parties 
directly involved are not the ones who are doing the negotiating, they will have no 
incentive to meet the agreed-upon terms.  That can be seen with the Bosnian Serbs, who 
felt Milosevic sold them out; it was not their agreement.  The negotiators at Dayton had 
good reason for choosing to deal with Milosevic—the Bosnian Serb leaders were indicted 
war criminals, and Milosevic had a greater incentive to work with NATO—but in the 
long term, it may prove a block to implementation.  Second, forcing unwilling parties—
the Bosniaks—to sign an agreement they did not agree with may have the same effect.  
Although some Bosniaks have acknowledged that it was probably the best deal they 
could get, there was bound to be resentment at being forced into a position of signing or 
being abandoned. 
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Lastly, the uncertain future of SFOR is a clear warning.  It is anyone’s guess how 
long SFOR ought to remain in Bosnia; the answer—until there is an atmosphere of trust 
and security—is true but not helpful.  That is not to say that the solution is a firm exit 
date.  Such operations cannot be done in, for example, a year.  They are long-term 
missions that may take generations.  NATO troops—and the member states—need to be 
prepared for that.  Since the Alliance has pinned its credibility and continued utility on 
the success in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it must be willing to see this mission through to the 
end.  The ongoing mission in Bosnia still affects the utility, credibility, and viability of 





























IV. NATO IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 
A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
Whereas the European powers were wrong to view the conflict in Bosnia as a 
civil war spinning out of control, they were equally wrong to see the situation in Kosovo 
as simply the oppression of an innocent minority by a brutal tyrant.  Few deny the 
brutality of some of the Serbian forces in the province, or that many innocent ethnic 
Albanians suffered or were killed.  However, not all the Kosovo Albanians were 
innocent.  Some were members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and they 
intentionally picked a fight starting in 1996.  The first two months of 1998 saw almost 
three quarters as many attacks as the previous two years combined.64  The KLA 
continued to attack until the Serbian forces finally snapped and overreacted.  On 28 
February 1998, Serbian police murdered thirteen civilians after a fruitless firefight with 
the KLA.65 
Added to the cycle of action/overreaction were steadily increasing threats of 
action by NATO if Milosevic did not rein in his Serb forces.  Plans were developed in 
June 1998, followed by an aerial demonstration over Albania and Macedonia; neither had 
an effect.66  UN Security Council resolutions demanding that the fighting stop and the 
talking start were likewise ignored.67  At the same time, there was no Security Council 
resolution authorizing NATO to use force inside a sovereign state, so for all their bluster, 
the hands of the Allies were tied.68  The situation on the ground was worsening and being 
broadcast around the world, increasing the pressure on the Alliance to do something. 69  
B. NATO’S INTERVENTION 
The key step to NATO intervention was the agreement by the Allies that the 
Alliance had all of the authority from the UNSC that it needed.  It was agreed that NATO 
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could act to stop a catastrophe in the making if Milosevic failed to abide by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1199.70  With winter approaching, and a large number of displaced 
people living in the hills, NATO approved the plan for Operation Allied Force; this threat 
was credible enough to force Milosevic to back down.  A cease-fire was declared and 
negotiations started.  Serbian military and police forces in Kosovo were reduced, 
monitored by international verifiers.71  Unfortunately, the KLA forces were not part of 
the deal for the cease-fire, and they used the time to reoccupy areas evacuated by the 
Serbs and to prepare for another fight.72  
On 8 January 1999, the KLA effectively picked another fight with Serbian forces, 
who replied with the massacre at Racak, where forty-five ethnic Albanian civilians were 
killed.  In response, NATO issued another threat to use force against both sides if 
negotiations were not completed, and then summoned the combatants to Rambouillet.73  
The Allies were confident that the continuing threat of air strikes would result in 
acceptance of the peace deal.  However, in the view of some, there were no negotiations 
at Rambouillet, only ultimatums issued with threats.  Additionally, the negotiators were 
accused—and not just by the Serbs—of having taken the KLA’s side from the start.74  
However, the Kosovar Albanians were not handed their wish list to sign.  They were 
given the same choice the Bosniaks had been given in November 1995:  “‘Sign or 
die.’”75  The Serbs remained silent while the Kosovar Albanians argued politely, and 
both sides seemed to be waiting for the other to be the cause of a failure.76  Neither side 
signed at that meeting, but when they reconvened about a month later, on 15 March 1999, 
the Kosovar Albanians were the only ones to sign. 77  
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One last meeting was held with Milosevic on 22 March 1999, to try to get his 
agreement by ensuring that he understood that the threat of NATO air strikes was 
genuine.  He understood but refused to agree.  Two days later, Operation Allied Force 
began.78  Although many NATO officials believed that the campaign would be short, it 
lasted seventy-eight days before Milosevic capitulated.79   Two operations were to be 
conducted simultaneously:  the Phased Air Operation, focused on air defense systems and 
enemy forces in Kosovo; and the Limited Air Operations, with authority to strike 
headquarters, forces, and facilities supporting the Serbian troops operating in Kosovo.80  
Restrictions placed on allied pilots, such as flying above 15,000 feet to limit the risk of 
casualties, greatly degraded their ability to hit troops on the move, so support facilities 
received most of the attention once the air defense systems were as degraded as 
possible.81  
C. THE END STATE 
There are currently 38,000 troops in Kosovo—down from the original 46,000 in 
June 1999—as part of KFOR, with the responsibility for preventing renewed hostilities in 
Kosovo, creating a safe and secure environment, demilitarizing the KLA, supporting the 
humanitarian effort, and supporting the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.  
KFOR is currently retraining members of the KLA to form the Kosovo Protection Corps 
(KPC).82  The mission got off to a rocky start, with returning Kosovar Albanians 
reportedly killing or kidnapping hundreds of Serbs and Gypsies (the latter accused by the 
Albanians of having collaborated with the Serbs) and turning thousands more into 
refugees in the first two months after KFOR’s arrival. 83  A survey conducted by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees a few months after KFOR entered Kosovo estimated 
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the Kosovo Serb population as only 70,000, approximately a third of the total before the 
NATO bombing.84  While tensions between the ethnic Serb and ethnic Albanian 
populations remain high and a cause for concern, NATO does claim some successes:  the 
original murder rate of fifty per week is down to four; several multi-ethnic police classes 
have graduated; the 28 October 2001 elections went relatively smoothly; and repairs are 
being made around the province.85  
Three years after the intervention, KFOR troops have found their job limited 
mostly to searching for and disposing of unauthorized munitions, foiling illegal border 
crossings, overseeing peaceful demonstrations, and conducting various acts of assistance.  
However, recent incidents demonstrate that not all residents are resigned to peaceful 
coexistence.  Two French KFOR members were wounded in a hand grenade attack in 
December 2001.  In January 2002, the arrest of a Serb militant in Kosovska Mitrovica by 
KFOR—after bystanders foiled an earlier attempt—led to rioting by mobs that attacked 
UN police officers.86  In April 2002, the same city was again the scene of violence.  
KFOR troops fired tear gas and stun grenades into a rioting crowd of hundreds of Kosovo 
Serbs after UN police arrested another Serb militant.87  The next day in Mitrovica, a 
crowd of over 500 people began stoning a UN police patrol.  The situation worsened 
when the police arrested the man that appeared to be orchestrating the riot; two grenades 
were thrown at the police and gunshots were exchanged.  KFOR troops were deployed to 
the area at the request of the UN police.88  These incidents have apparently been both rare 
enough and not recent enough to allow NATO to agree to reductions in the number of 
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troops stationed in Kosovo—although the exact form the restructuring will take and the 
date of completion has not yet been agreed upon—from the current 38,000 to 33,200.89 
D. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
Negotiations regarding Kosovo showed the same weaknesses as were evident 
regarding Bosnia, and this time they had a greater effect.  Not dealing with the KLA gave 
the guerrillas an opportunity to restart the fighting on their terms and thereby force 
NATO to act.  Rambouillet was an attempt to force two unwilling parties, and only one 
gave in.  One of the great “what if’s” of the negotiations is whether Milosevic would 
have signed at Rambouillet had he been offered the same deal he was at the end of 
Operation Allied Force.  Many have argued that the negotiators can not claim to have 
“gone the extra mile,” as U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted, if the deal 
offered Milosevic after the bombing conceded more than the original. 90  
Perhaps the most important lesson from the Kosovo campaign is that military 
operations must be conducted in a way that meets the stated mission objectives.  The 
objective in Kosovo was to prevent a worsening of the humanitarian disaster taking 
place.91  However, General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), informed Albright before Operation Allied Force began that stopping the 
Serbs from targeting the Kosovar Albanians was not possible.92  Regardless, the 
intervention went forward as planned, and in the eleven weeks of the bombing campaign, 
approximately four times as many people died in Kosovo than had during the period from 
when the fighting started in 1996 until the beginning of the air campaign.  Two hundred 
and thirty thousand people had been displaced before the bombing started; after it was 
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over, the number was 1.4 million. 93  Whether this was the result of a planned assault—
the rumored “Operation Horseshoe”—on the part of the Serbs is not the issue; the fact 
that NATO failed to meet its objectives with disastrous results is.94   
The complete dichotomy of the Serbian actions and the NATO response is best 
demonstrated in a passage in the U.S. after action report: 
Milosevic was unable to challenge superior allied military capabilities 
directly.  Therefore, he chose to fight chiefly through indirect means:  use 
of terror tactics against Kosovar civilians; attempts to exploit the premium 
the alliance placed on minimizing civilian casualties and collateral 
damage; creation of enormous refugee flows to create a humanitarian 
crisis…Milosevic’s military forces were forced into hiding throughout 
most of the campaign, staying in caves and tunnels and under the cover of 
forest, village, or weather…He chose his tactics in the hope of exploiting 
our legitimate political concerns about target selection, collateral damage, 
and conducting military operations against enemy forces intermingled 
with civilian refugees.95 
The above statement completely misses the key point about Operation Allied 
Force:  NATO needed to stop the Serbian forces in order to complete its mission, not the 
other way around.  The answer to why NATO did not is comprised of two parts:  first, 
how the bombing campaign was conducted; second, the unwillingness to employ ground 
troops to do what the bombing campaign could not. 
NATO’s targeting choices during the air campaign offer lessons both as far as the 
Alliance and the indigenous population are concerned.  The targets had to be cleared 
through the political chains of command, but this proved both contentious—some allies 
wanted different priorities while others tried to protect certain interests—and possibly 
risky to security, in light of the exposure of a leak reportedly created by a French 
official. 96  However, mechanisms were developed to allow for the delegation of target 
approval authority for certain targets to the military commanders.97  The difficulty in 
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hitting targets such as mobile troops in Kosovo has already been mentioned, but there is 
another aspect—striking targets such as television stations, bridges, and electric power 
systems is effective on a strategic level. 98  However, destroying these targets results in 
the suffering of innocent civilians and potentially even civilian casualties.  Serbian public 
opinion coalesced largely as a result of the impression that the Serbs were NATO’s true 
target.  Owing to the scarcity of exclusively military targets, about sixty percent of the 
targets attacked were dual-use (civilian and military).99  Inevitable mistakes resulted in 
500-2,000 killed and 6,000 wounded.100  
The reluctance of most Allies to employ troops on the ground in Kosovo 
contributed to difficulties in conducting NATO’s stated mission.  While NATO was 
destroying bridges and ammunition depots, Serb forces continued their “ethnic cleansing” 
in Kosovo.  The bombing of strategic targets may have affected Milosevic’s ability to 
conduct military operations in the long run, but he was not operating in the long run.  
Only targeting the troops involved in actual operations in Kosovo would have stopped 
those troops from conducting their “ethnic cleansing;” as that was extremely difficult 
from the air (especially at an altitude of 15,000 feet), the only other option was to do it 
from the ground.  In fact, there was speculation that if the Allies had even appeared 
willing to put troops on the ground, Milosevic might have been deterred from deploying 
his forces in the first place.101  Unfortunately, announcements like the one made by 
President Clinton in March 1999 that “I don’t intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight 
a war” made it clear to Milosevic that he did not need to even spare troops to defend the 
borders of Serbia.102 
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NATO proved to be completely unprepared for the number of refugees created 
during the air campaign.  When the refugees began to pour in to FYROM, Albania, 
Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the supplies to house and feed them were not on 
hand, despite earlier insistence that the Allies were prepared for Serbian actions.103  
NATO documented many resources found to be important but lacking:  linguists, 
engineering assets for emergency repairs of roads and bridges, detailed maps, and 
prepositioned aid supplies such as tents and water.104  In a historical overview of 
NATO’s intervention, the Alliance trumpeted its contribution to the refugee effort, 
pointing out that it provided equipment and built camps for 50,000 refugees in Albania—
a number that pales in comparison with the 430,000 refugees that had reached Albania by 
the end of May 1999.  The NATO humanitarian aid mission was impressive once it got 
underway, transporting over 4,500 tons of food and water and nearly 1,600 tons of 
medical gear.105  However, had the Alliance been as prepared as it claimed to have been, 
there would not have been a delay of several days to get the humanitarian aid portion of 
its “humanitarian intervention” operative. 
Lastly, just as in Bosnia, NATO failed to act preventively to keep the conflict 
from worsening.  Western leaders in 1998 toughened up their rhetoric to Milosevic to 
demonstrate they that had learned the lesson of Bosnia, but no action was taken even 
though some diplomats had been pushing for NATO to devote attention to the impending 
conflict for over a year.106  Prevention is difficult, partly because it demands that 
governments turn their attention away from current problems to potential problems.  By 
postponing action in the Kosovo conflict, NATO again found itself in a situation not of 
its making, a crisis in which it was forced to take military action on someone else’s terms.  
The Balkan crises have shown that more forward thinking is essential. 107  
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V. NATO IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF 
MACEDONIA 
A. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
Even after the three-year war in Bosnia (1992-1995) and the influx of refugees in 
the wake of the Kosovo conflict (1998-1999), FYROM appeared to be avoiding similar 
ethnic fighting.  This illusion was shattered in February 2001 with the appearance of the 
National Liberation Army (NLA).  The NLA claimed to be comprised of “freedom 
fighters” along the lines of the KLA, fighting for greater rights for the ethnic Albanian 
minority in FYROM.  The government accused them of being terrorists—and in some 
cases former KLA members—and refused to negotiate at the barrel of the gun.  Sporadic 
fighting broke out from February 2001 until a Western-brokered cease-fire on 5 July 
2001 offered an opportunity to search for a political settlement to the conflict.108  During 
the search for a cease-fire and afterwards, NATO’s political leaders were heavily 
engaged in FYROM.  The Secretary General and several other high level officials visited 
frequently and invited FYROM government officials to Brussels, and a civilian NATO 
representative was assigned to the country to provide coordination and foster 
communication between the government and NATO.  A personal representative of the 
Secretary General was also assigned to FYROM to help broker the cease-fire.109  
An enduring cease-fire was one of four steps required of the two sides before a 
NATO deployment to the country to aid in disarming the rebel NLA.  The other three 
were a general political agreement among the main political parties, a disarmament plan 
agreed upon by the rebels and the government, and an agreement between NATO and the 
FYROM government on NATO forces entering the country to conduct their mission. 110  
As the political parties worked on the outlines of a Western-backed peace plan, NATO 
developed the plan for Operation Essential Harvest.  At the same time, in order to 
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increase the stability of FYROM, KFOR increased border patrols, seizing over 3,000 
weapons, 73,000 rounds of ammunition, and 385 illegal border crossers in a month and a 
half.  KFOR also shared intelligence and surveillance information with FYROM 
authorities, as well as providing a tactical liaison team to the FYROM forces.111  
Despite intermittent bursts of violence, the cease-fire held in general.  On 13 
August 2001 the FYROM political leaders signed a peace deal that granted much-sought 
rights to the ethnic Albanian minority, such as recognition of Albanian as a second 
official language, more local control, and greater representation in the police force.  In 
return, the ethnic Albanian minority recognized the inviolability of FYROM’s borders.  
Although the NLA was not a signatory to the deal, it pledged to abide by it and to disarm 
pending an offer of amnesty and indications that the constitutional reforms were being 
carried out.112  
B. NATO’S INTERVENTION 
On 22 August 2001, Operation Essential Harvest was launched with 3,500 troops 
and a thirty-day mandate to disarm the NLA. 113  Task Force Harvest had three key tasks:  
collection of weapons and ammunition from the NLA; transportation and disposal of the  
weapons; and transportation and destruction of the ammunition. 114  Almost immediately, 
the NATO operation faced its most serious challenge:  the death of a British soldier, 
Sapper Ian Collins.  Some had wondered if NATO would continue with the operation in 
the face of any Alliance fatalities, and the Alliance answered those concerns by carrying 
on with its mission.  For the first time the U.S. provided no combat troops, only logistics 
and medical support.115  There were snags with the collection process, mostly centered 
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on the intransigence of some members of the FYROM parliament.  Weapons collection 
occurred in three stages, and the government needed to show good faith by meeting 
certain requirements on the road to reform of the constitution.  There was also much 
rancorous disagreement on the number and type of weapons collected by NATO.  The 
operation’s goal was to collect 3,300 weapons, while the government estimated that the 
NLA held from 8,000 to 85,000.116  The government also objected to the unusable 
condition of some of the weapons that were accepted by NATO troops in Task Force 
Harvest and counted against the total.  However, by 25 September 2001, NATO had 
collected 3,381 weapons and declared its mission accomplished.117  
C. THE END STATE 
However, there was much concern both within and outside FYROM that the 
peace simply would not hold without a guarantor.  Monitors were being dispatched to the 
state to verify the implementation of the peace plan, but Bosnia had shown how 
ineffective unarmed or lightly armed monitors could be.  Those operating in Kosovo had 
their security provided by KFOR, but there was no such force envisioned for FYROM.  
The government formally requested one, and NATO developed Operation Amber Fox in 
response.  Task Force Fox was activated on 26 September 2001 to assist in protecting the 
international monitors.  The initial mandate was for three months, with the option to 
prolong depending on the situation in FYROM.118  Operation Amber Fox has been 
extended three times, for three months the first two times and  for four months in the most 
recent extension; the current expiration date for the operation is 26 October 2002. 119  
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Task Force Fox consists of 700 troops that can be supplemented with 300 troops already 
in country if necessary.120  
The last serious incident that apparently occurred between two groups of different 
ethnicities in FYROM was a small battle in the town of Mala Recica on 25 March 2002.  
Gunfire and grenades were exchanged; the Task Force Fox patrol in the area called for 
additional support teams to monitor the situation and counter any threat to the 
international observers in the area.  The next morning the troops entered the town and 
verified two dead and three injured.  The Albanian National Army (ANA) claimed 
responsibility for one group.121  The ANA emerged in November 2001, claiming to fight 
for “the liberation of all Albanian territories in former Yugoslavia,” despite a 
membership that totaled only about fifty. 122  However, the ANA has not been much 
heard from since, and the most severe problem encountered by the monitors in the field 
since has been the occasional protest roadblock.123  Another gun battle took place on 4 
April 2002, possibly a continuation of fighting from the week before that left two dead; 
but this time it was probably between rival guerrilla factions.124  At the same time, the 
government has continued, albeit slowly at times, to carry out its part of the deal.  Two 
key laws in the peace plan, the self-government law and the full amnesty law, were 
passed on 25 January and 8 March 2002, respectively.125 
D. LESSONS BEING LEARNED 
Of the potential lessons identified in this thesis, some appear to have been applied 
in the operations in FYROM, though not all.  However, by far the most important—not 
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least because it nullifies many of the rest—was the need to intervene early in a crisis.  
This clearly took place in FYROM.  Although NATO did not become involved until after 
violence had broken out, it was still at a low and manageable level.  The population, 
military, and police had not yet reached the point of no return where only a military 
solution was feasible.  In fact, before conducting Operation Essential Harvest, NATO 
stated firmly that there was “no military solution to the present crisis.”126  From the 
beginning of the crisis, NATO was heavily involved both politically and—using the 
forces in KFOR across the border—militarily.  As a result, the question of how to 
conduct a combat operation never came up.  Early involvement also allowed NATO to 
intervene on its own terms, in contrast with the previous two operations. 
Caution must be exercised in comparing the intervention in FYROM with those in 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo conflicts.  It is difficult to say what the outcome 
would have been in either of the latter had intervention been undertaken earlier.  
However, a key difference in FYROM as compared to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
is that both sides welcomed NATO’s intervention.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
government was willing to see an intervention; the Bosnian Serbs were not.  In Kosovo, 
the Kosovar Albanians were hoping that NATO or other international forces would 
intervene, but the Serbian government that ruled the province was not open to a 
deployment of any international forces.  Perhaps earlier intervention in the Kosovo 
conflict, and intervention of a more political nature, would have made the need to deploy 
international forces moot, perhaps not.  In any case, the interventions in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo were of a different sort than the one in FYROM.  NATO must 
be prepared for both types of crisis management operations. 
The parties themselves conducted most of the negotiations in this crisis.  The 
peace plan, although backed by Western powers, was not imposed upon either side.  This 
left the responsibility for finding a middle ground up to those involved, and, one may 
hope, this will result in terms more acceptable to the population.  It also gives both parties 
greater incentives to work through to a solution than would a settlement imposed from 
the outside.  A poll in late August 2001 found 50.3% in favor of the constitutional 
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reforms.127   Although, once again, one of the parties was left out of the negotiations—in 
this case, the NLA, much as the KLA had been absent from the Rambouillet 
negotiations—this time that party agreed to abide by the peace plan as if it was a 
signatory. 
Although the jury is still out on the overall success of Operations Essential 
Harvest and Amber Fox, U.S. leadership appears to have been unnecessary in this case.  
The British commanded Task Force Harvest; the Germans command Task Force Fox and 
will be relieved by the Dutch in June 2002.  American participation has been minimal.  
Observers in both NATO and EU countries have asked whether it is time for the EU to 
step in and begin dealing with such crises with its own military capabilities.  Such a move 
is certainly not imminent, as it would require an asset sharing agreement between NATO 
and the EU to be finalized.  The governments of some Allies also disagree with the 
implied division of labor, due to potential effects on the relationship with the United 
States.128  However, as far as NATO is concerned, Task Force Harvest and Task Force 
Fox have shown that interventions not requiring combat, at least, can be undertaken 
without either U.S. leadership or U.S. forces. 
The one lesson, unfortunately, that NATO does not yet appear to have embraced 
is the need for a long-term presence when dealing with deeply engrained ethnic conflicts.  
While IFOR accomplished its assigned mission, it was so narrowly defined that it made 
little difference to the stability of Bosnia.  Both SFOR and KFOR are open-ended, in 
recognition of the long-term commitment needed in those countries.  Task Force Fox’s 
mandate has come up for review twice; twice it has been extended at the request of the 
FYROM government, but each time only for an additional three months.  Admitting the 
need for an out-of-area mission of indefinite duration in the Balkans is problematic for 
many NATO member states.  However, the setting of firm exit dates rather than goals to 
determine mission accomplishment runs the risk of undoing all the good that the initial 
intervention was meant to do.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
NATO today is in many ways far removed from the NATO of the beginning of 
the 1990s, and even further from the NATO of the Cold War.  The Strategic Concepts 
issued in 1991 and 1999 are strong indicators of the change in the Alliance, because they 
are public—rather than classified—documents, with a higher focus on political goals than 
military operations.  Both combined collective defense with the need to promote stability 
and security throughout Europe, including through selective crisis management 
interventions.129  The Alliance now has nearly a decade of experience in crisis 
management operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FRY, and FYROM.  However, the 
most recent Strategic Concept, published in 1999, does not hold many differences from 
the 1991 version as far as crisis management operations are concerned.  The 2001 NATO 
Handbook is based on the  1999 Strategic Concept.  Neither of these recent articulations 
of policy appears to capture many of the lessons that should have been learned from 
operations in the Balkans. 
As in the 1999 Strategic Concept, the NATO Handbook identifies crisis 
management as a fundamental task of the Alliance “in order to enhance the security and 
stability of the Euro-Atlantic area.”  The three elements of NATO’s crisis management 
policy are “dialogue, cooperation with other countries, and the maintenance of NATO’s 
collective defense capability.”130  While partnership with non-NATO nations is part of 
the fundamental task of promoting stability in Europe, it is also a key aspect of crisis 
management.  Partnership is viewed as a way both to avoid future conflicts and to bring 
many states together, if necessary, in crisis management activities.131  NATO has 
established a political structure to handle the decision-making and consensus building 
required by crisis management operations.132  A military structure including immediate 
and rapid reaction forces—land, sea, and air—ready at short notice for crisis response has 
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also been organized.133  Lastly, the NATO Handbook acknowledges the Alliance’s need 
for links with other security institutions, specifically the UN, the OSCE, the EU, the 
WEU, and the Council of Europe for a “wider institutional framework for security.”134  
NATO has worked closely with the first three institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
FRY, and FYROM.135 
However, the focus in the NATO Handbook still appears too narrow to cover even 
the operations that NATO is currently conducting in the Balkans. According to the NATO 
Handbook, “in the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of 
the Alliance members, NATO forces must…contribute to the management of such crises 
and to their peaceful resolution.”136  None of the crises in the Balkans fits this narrow 
interpretation of a crisis that requires NATO intervention, as none had the potential to 
result in a military threat to the security of any NATO member state.  The NATO 
Handbook includes a section that specifically addresses military operations as part of 
crisis management: 
Moreover, as in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, where NATO 
forces are currently deployed, future Alliance military operations are 
likely to be markedly different from the kind of operation for which 
planning was undertaken during the Cold War.  They will probably take 
place outside Alliance territory; they may last for many years; and they 
will involve troops of many nations working closely together--principally 
from member states but also, in some instances, from Partner countries.  
Moreover, crisis management tasks demand different skills from those 
required for fighting wars.137 
This statement fails to acknowledge, however, that some crisis management 
operations are not that different from fighting wars—Operations Deliberate Force and 
Allied Force are two recent examples.  The references to operations that can last for years 
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and involve partners, including those in Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean 
Dialogue, appear to address only SFOR and KFOR.  This is a key omission in NATO’s 
crisis management doctrine as delineated in the NATO Handbook.  Despite the military 
organization and structure sections, and despite the reference to active crisis 
management, the handbook is mostly dedicated to the conflict prevention form of crisis 
management: dialogue and cooperation with partner states.  However, two of NATO’s 
three interventions in the Balkans were undertaken after dialogue and cooperation had 
failed—where it had been attempted—and where combat operations were needed to 
impose order and reach a point where there was a peace to keep. 
Only the intervention in FYROM has followed the pattern of a crisis management 
operation in which conflict prevention was all that was required.  It met many of the 
conditions the Alliance outlined in both the 1999 Strategic Concept and the NATO 
Handbook.  Intervention occurred early in the crisis, before military forces were required 
to fight for a peace rather than keep one.  The intervention started with intense dialogue 
that recognized the concerns of both sides and allowed them to negotiate with each other, 
rather than attempting to impose a settlement unacceptable to one or both parties.  The 
need to intervene in FYROM was accepted much more easily than in either Bosnia-
Herzegovina or the FRY.  However, this intervention is not being conducted in 
accordance with the passage from the NATO Handbook quoted above, in which 
operations that “may last for many years” are foreseen.  With that exception, Operations 
Essential Harvest and Amber Fox are consistent with a crisis management doctrine that 
covers all necessary aspects. 
The interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY, however, require a 
doctrine that is not contained in the NATO Handbook.  Moreover, the way in which they 
were conducted was not in line with the doctrine as published.  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
NATO had very little dialogue with the parties involved, especially as NATO officials 
refused to deal with the leaders of one of those parties, the Bosnian Serbs.  Additionally, 
in both cases intervention was delayed until NATO felt it had to act.   
Relations between the Alliance and other international security institutions, 
notably the UN in the Bosnian case, were strained during the combat military operations; 
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they have, however, been successful for SFOR and KFOR activities.  SFOR and KFOR 
operations are likely to continue, albeit at a much reduced level from when they began, 
for years to come. 
In the Kosovo conflict, NATO made many of the same mistakes as in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Dialogue, such as it was, did not initially involve all parties.  Negotiations, 
especially those at Rambouillet, were in name only, because NATO was attempting to 
impose a settlement on both the Serbs and the KLA.  Intervention was again delayed until 
NATO’s options were limited to combat operations.  Those operations were complicated 
by the Alliance’s decision to conduct only a bombing campaign, and that with various 
force protection measures that made it difficult to interfere with the Serb police, military, 
and paramilitary actions underway on the ground.  This operation was thus unable to 
meet the objectives laid out by NATO before the commencement of Operation Allied 
Force—above all, to stop Milosevic from carrying out his “ethnic cleansing.”  The air 
campaign concentrated largely on strategic rather than tactical targets, allowing the 
Serbian forces in Kosovo to create a refugee flow for which NATO was unprepared. 
Since combat operations have clearly been part of NATO crisis management 
operations in the past, the Alliance’s crisis management doctrine and key policy 
articulations such as the Strategic Concept should anticipate them in the future.  As noted 
earlier, a key difference between the interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY, 
and the intervention in FYROM is that the latter involved two sides willing to work with 
NATO.  That was not the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the FRY.  The Alliance’s 
doctrine should therefore acknowledge that early intervention with dialogue and 
cooperation will not be enough to manage every crisis.  In some cases, NATO must be 
prepared to conduct “peacemaking” operations in accordance with the lessons learned 
from previous crisis management operations and thereby create a situation in which 
peacekeeping and eventual political reconciliation are possible. 
NATO’s crisis management doctrine must emphasize the importance of 
negotiations with all parties involved in a conflict, with due regard for their concerns.  
When NATO is co-operating with other security institutions, clear and acceptable chains 
of command must be worked out in advance, to avoid difficulties such as the NATO-UN 
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disagreements seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina before Operation Deliberate Force.  When the 
Alliance determines that a combat mission is required to manage a crisis, that mission 
must be designed to complete the desired objectives.  Specifically, the possible need for 
ground combat during an intervention must be acknowledged.  Although strategic 
bombing at high altitudes with high levels of force protection is less dangerous to NATO 
forces and therefore less politically sensitive than ground combat, Operation Allied Force 
demonstrated that it is not always an effective means to meet the objectives of the 
mission.  Finally, the Allies must demonstrate through deeds that their commitment to the 
long haul in crisis management is more than just words on the page. 
As NATO and Russia sign agreements bringing them closer together, the need for 
collective defense in the Cold War sense of the concept seems ever less likely.  However, 
sources of potential instability in eastern and central Europe persist over a decade after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  NATO continues to play a key role in bringing 
stability and security to all of Europe through its Partnership for Peace, Membership 
Action Plan, and the conduct of crisis management operations in the Balkans.  NATO 
remains the only security institution in Europe equipped to deal effectively with crises 
such as those seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FRY, and FYROM.138  The Alliance has 
shown itself adept at peacekeeping in SFOR, KFOR, and Operations Essential Harvest 
and Amber Fox.  At the same time, Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force have 
demonstrated that combat operations outside NATO territory will also be part of crisis 
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